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 Contending cultures of counter-terrorism: 
 
Transatlantic divergence or convergence? 
 
 
 
Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich 
 
 
 
The July 2005 terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom have re-focused attention on the 
threat from Islamic extremists. Parallels have been drawn with the attacks on Madrid in 
2004 and the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Yet the attacks also underline the 
differing circumstances and responses that characterise the experiences of Europe on the 
one hand, and the United States on the other. This article elucidates these differences and 
seeks to place them within the broader context of historically determined strategic 
cultures.  
 
The context in which the attacks occurred was very different in the cases of the UK and 
Spain compared to the United States. The two European countries have long experience 
of fighting a serious domestic terrorist menace, whilst the US had no such history. The 
presence of sizeable Muslim populations at home was a factor in the European attacks in 
contrast to the United States. Prior to 2003, most European countries were seen as 
indifferent supporters of American policy in the Middle East and were not identified by 
Islamicists as a main source of aggression against Muslims around the world.   
 
The responses to the attacks illustrated the remarkable gulf in strategic culture between 
the two sides of the Atlantic. The US-declared a ‘global war on terrorism’ and directed 
the full resources of a ‘national security’ approach towards the threat posed by a 'new 
terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus between 
international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and ‘states of concern’.  At home 
the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened the sources 
of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and 
courts and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies.  
 1
 In contrast, Europe has conceived the problem differently. It has conceptualized radical 
Islam in less absolute terms and accordingly its approach to counter terrorism has 
emphasised 'regional multilateralism' rather than 'global unilateralism'. Its military forces 
have attempted to encourage peacekeeping, reconstruction and security sector reform as 
well as partaking in gruelling counter-insurgencies. Their foreign policies have continued 
to emphasize the containment of risk, consensus building and balance of power. 
Domestically, legal changes relating to surveillance and civil rights have been less 
sweeping, while the enhancements to internal security architecture have been more 
modest. Underpinning this different approach is not only a European desire to draw on 
some of the lessons from decades of counter-terrorism but also a growing conviction that 
the 'newness' of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda has been exaggerated. The implications of 
these divergent cultures are enormous for the future of the relationship between Europe 
and the United States. 
 
Since the Spring of 2005 there has been evidence that the US is moving closer to the 
European position by adopting a new strategy of counter-terrorism and seeking greater 
multilateral engagement.  In March, the NSC began a review of US national policy 
designed to address a more 'diffuse' terrorism and a new national security presidential 
decision directive on counter-terrorism is expected before the end of the year.1 
Meanwhile the Pentagon adopted a new strategic plan that emphasised non-military 
instruments and more co-operation with allies.2  In bureaucratic terms the arrival of 
Condoleeza Rice at the State Department has had a catalytic effect, accelerating this 
change. To what extent does this presage a more convergent transatlantic approach to 
international terrorism? This article suggests that while strategic doctrines may change, 
the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult. 
Moreover, while some officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems 
more accurately, their slippery nature mean that neither Europe nor America yet has 
convincing answers.  
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Strategic Cultures 
Strategic culture remains an ill-defined and under-utilised concept. Its employment  must 
be accompanied by an acknowledgment of its limitations, accepting that even amongst 
political sociologists, ideas such as ‘culture’ remain contested.3 Strategic culture is based 
on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political 
system and culture, to deal with security issues in a particular way. Other factors may 
influence a state’s strategic choices, such as its level of technological development, but 
its preferences will be shaped most strongly by its past. These institutional memories will 
help to determine how threats are perceived, as well as conditioning the likely responses.4 
Officials quickly absorb the unspoken norms associated with a strategic culture, which 
may be as important in ruling out policy options that are ‘inappropriate’, as they are in 
determining the precise nature of paths taken.5
 
The idea of a strategic culture or strategic personality has been most closely connected 
with defence issues and above all war-fighting problems.6  Caroline Ziemke, one of the 
first to make use of this approach, has suggested that it is about a state’s self-conception, 
mediated though the historical experience of its past conflicts. Historical experience and 
strategic culture are often connected though a process of reasoning by analogy. Decision-
makers tend to focus strongly on the commanding heights of their past strategic 
experience, navigating in terms of major episodes which are regarded as successes or 
failures.7 These seminal experiences have burned themselves deeply into the national 
psyche and have significant unconscious meaning.8 Munich and Suez, more recently 
Vietnam and Somalia - perhaps soon Afghanistan and Iraq - are all examples of what Dan 
Reiter has called the 'weight of the shadow of the past'.9
 
It is difficult to apply the concept of strategic culture to the phenomenon of international 
terrorism because it crosses a number of established boundaries. First, international 
terrorism blurs the boundaries between external security and internal security: the 
perpetrators may originate from abroad but commit acts of violence against citizens in the 
homelands of their targets. Second, state responses are likely to be mixed: ranging from 
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the use of force against the sources of terrorism to increasing internal security measures 
such as law enforcement and judicial action.10  
 
Nevertheless, the classical literature on counter-terrorism identifies, at least in outline, 
typologies of state-response to terrorism. Traditional ways of addressing terrorism might 
be grouped into three broad categories: first, military-led approaches focused on a 
mixture of pre-emption, deterrence or retribution; second, regulatory or legal-judicial 
responses that seek to enhance the criminal penalties for terrorist activities and improve 
civil/police co-operation; and third, appeasing options ranging from accommodation to 
concession.11   
 
The United States has evolved a sharply defined strategic culture. Its approach has been 
shaped by a belief in American exceptionalism, that its political and moral values are 
superior to those of the rest of the world and justify its position of leadership. This has 
given it a sense of mission in the world and a confidence that its actions are in the 
broadest interests of humanity.12 This self-belief has been allied to strategies that seek 
ways to leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American 
policymakers toward a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a 
superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the 
international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no 
targets are beyond its ability to strike. Since 9/11, increased American spending on 
defence (and especially defence research) relative to other major powers has accentuated 
this phenomenon.    
 
Although the United States has been involved in counter-terrorism since the mid-1960s, it 
was only after the Iran hostages crisis of 1979 that this subject featured regularly on the 
presidential agenda. The US has consistently displayed an under-developed and 
somewhat two-dimensional counter-terrorism culture. In part this is because counter-
terrorism has been seen as an unattractive political issue. In the White House there was a 
fear of encouraging public expectations that could not be fulfilled and a tendency towards 
blame-avoidance. Meanwhile the US intelligence community was narrowly focused on 
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the Cold War, playing to its strengths in technical collection, and relying on allied 
expertise for coverage of less important subjects. Terrorism was frequently perceived as 
something sponsored by the Soviet bloc and was regarded as a minor subset of the 'real 
problem'.13  
 
American counter-terrorist operations have been adversely affected by a diet and binge 
approach to covert action and aggressive human intelligence collection. After the largesse 
of the first three decades of the Cold War, covert action became mired in the foreign 
policy struggles between the Congress and the White House during the 1970s. Special 
activities were shackled under President Carter and covert action appeared to be a dying 
art form. The Reagan era heralded the ‘unleashing of the CIA’ only for it to become 
bogged down once again in the Iran-Contra fiasco of 1986.14 During the late 1980s covert 
action was rehabilitated partially by success in Afghanistan against the Soviets, only to 
meet a renewed downturn after the end of the Cold War. A risk-averse culture in the CIA 
was reinforced by a decision in the mid-1990s to drop agents that were either ‘unsavoury’ 
or politically risky.15 Inevitably, 9/11 signalled a further swing of the pendulum.16  
 
The US experience of terrorism has been confined principally to its presence overseas.  
Attacks upon its armed forces have been frequent and occasionally devastating, for 
example, the loss of 241 US Marines in Beirut in 1983. Yet it was not until the attack on 
the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that 
the US experienced serious terrorism on its own shores. This absence of a sizeable 
domestic threat resulted in domestic counter-terror capacity being allowed to languish:  
there was a feeling that the country was invulnerable. This misperception was cruelly 
exposed by the attacks of 9/11. The intensity of the US reaction to 9/11 was a reflection 
of the enormous loss of life and gave the US the political will to use force more readily 
on the international stage. Although the United States has long been perceived as 'trigger 
happy' in reality, prior to 9/11, all presidents - even Ronald Reagan - have agonised 
before taking action in the realm of counter-terrorism.17 After 2001 the constraints that 
hitherto made America a ‘reluctant sheriff’ were stripped away and a new predisposition 
towards pre-emptive action was inaugurated.18
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 US strategic culture has also led to international terrorism being linked to a nexus of 
other threats. America’s sense of its global responsibilities has meant that it has long been 
concerned with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and states that 
reject the prevailing order. Even prior to 9/11, the Clinton administration was warning of 
the potential linkages between international terrorist groups and ‘states of concern’.19 It 
was clear that the interaction between these issues were regarded by some as the foremost 
threat to American security. Once again, military power was perceived to be the principal 
instrument to address these challenges.  
 
In contrast to the United States, a European strategic culture is more elusive. The most 
obvious reason for this is that Europe comprises a mix of nations, each with their own 
particular histories. Although they all now share important attributes – liberal 
democracies, market economies and adherence to the rule of law – they have diverged in 
their experiences of terrorism. Many countries, such as France, Spain, and the UK have 
contended with significant domestic terrorist movements while others, such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium, have been spared a major domestic threat. Some European 
countries have more historic associations with counter-insurgency and terrorism in an 
‘end-of-empire’ context, but these experiences are each rather different. Moreover, the 
fact that terrorism was usually a national problem meant that it rarely resulted in 
sustained cooperation between European states. Individual European states possessed 
sophisticated internal security systems for combating terrorism and there was often 
significant bilateral intelligence exchange, but comparatively little effort was invested in 
trying to build inter-state structures. 
 
Another factor is that attempts to galvanise a coherent European identity in foreign and 
security affairs only recently met with success. It was not until the Treaty on European 
Union, ratified in November 1993, that a foreign and security policy, as well as an 
internal security policy, became an avowed goal. Yet the challenge of terrorism has 
suited the EU’s particular attributes. Its pre-existing role in the internal security of its 
member states and its activities in the field of Justice and Home Affairs ensured that the 
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EU would be the mechanism chosen for regional counter terrorism. Since 9/11 there has 
been momentum to build a more robust system of international cooperation.20  
 
Notwithstanding these complications, elements of a European style, focused on 
regulatory responses and the judiciary might be said to have emerged during efforts 
against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a 
hallmark of French responses to Islamicist extremism during the 1980s and 1990s.21 
Even the UK, which engaged in a long military campaign against the Provisional IRA, 
gradually allocated more responsibility for counter-terrorism to civilian agencies. The 
repeated assertions by Gijs de Vries, the EU’s counter-terrorism co-ordinator, that 
Eurojust and Europol have a leading role in the EU’s counter-terrorist effort underlines 
this European regulatory approach with its focus on civil agencies.22 The regulatory 
response has suited current European needs remarkably well because of its strong 
domestic dimension. The 9/11 attacks brought home to Europe its own vulnerability. Not 
only were many of the perpetrators of the attacks formerly resident in Europe, but 
concentrations of Muslim populations in western Europe far exceed those of the US. For 
example, the Netherlands is home to one million Muslims, the UK one and a half million, 
Germany just over four million and France some six million.23 Whilst the vast majority 
of those citizens are law abiding, the July 2005 bombings in London demonstrated that 
small pockets of second generation resident Muslims can be won over to the cause of 
suicide bombing. 
 
Assessing the nature of the ‘New Terrorism’ 
Strategic cultures, and indeed cultures of counter-terrorism, are to some degree 
historically determined and represent significant elements of continuity in a realm of 
change. Few things underline this better than the different ways in which the United 
States and Europe have conceived of the ‘new terrorism’. One of the historic traits 
associated with American strategic culture has been a tendency to assert the importance 
of new developments that break with past.  In the 1990s this was most clearly illustrated 
by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate. After 9/11 the assertions of a 
‘strategic revolution’ were quickly transferred to the field of terrorism. Al-Qaeda was 
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deemed to be an example of 'new terrorism' – perhaps even a ‘catastrophic terrorism’ - 
that confounded the old lessons about this seemingly well-understood phenomenon. 
Indeed, more recently, commentators in both the United States and Europe have begun to 
speak of a 'new Al-Qaeda' that is different yet again from the 'new terrorism' of 9/11.24  
 
The most plausible assertions about the emergence of 'new terrorism' were made in the 
mid-1990s by Bruce Hoffman, a senior analyst with RAND. Hoffman argued that 
terrorism was changing, with 'new adversaries, new motivations, and new methods', 
which challenged many of our most fundamental assumptions about terrorists and how 
they operate. Hoffman noted that while instances of attacks were going down, casualties 
were going up. He explained this in terms of a new religious terrorism which defied the 
old dictum that terrorist wanted only a few people dead, but many people watching. Now, 
it appeared, killing was no longer an ugly form of political communication, or a form of 
bargaining with violence, instead it was becoming a religious duty. In other words the 
new terror was more apolitical and casualties were themselves the objective. This 
conjured up an alarming world without restraint in which the realist world of bargains, 
deterrence and rational behaviour evaporated, offering the prospect of terrorists who 
might seek to use weapons of mass destruction, if they could obtain access.  It also 
implied that militant Islam might attack the developed states of the West, not because of 
what it was doing in the Middle East, but simply because of what it was. The catastrophic 
events of 9/11 seemed to herald such an era and offered an obvious rationale for a hard-
nosed military response.25
 
There is now some disagreement about the newness of the ‘new terrorism’ and four years 
after 9/11 the picture stands in need of reassessment. On the one hand, the rise of 
religious terrorism generally, since the early 1990s, and of terrorism by Islamicist groups 
in particular, is undeniable. A quarter of a million trained and radicalised Mujahadeen 
exiting from South Asia at the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan has 
fuelled this development. They headed for their home countries, from the Mahgreb to 
Indonesia, or for new conflicts in Chechnya or Bosnia. Their organisation is more 
fissiparous than the old terrorism, an ideological community rather than a fixed hierarchy. 
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Al-Qaeda has tended to invest sporadic training and expertise in particular groups, rather 
than directing them. For many radical Islamicist groups, Osama bin Laden is an icon 
rather than leader.26  
 
However, important elements of the old terrorism remain. Since 9/11, terrorist attacks 
have often been smaller and have been targeted on members of the coalitions fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, the overwhelming balance of effort by radicalised groups 
since 2003 has been to provide volunteer foreign fighters for the conflict in Iraq. The 
much vaunted use of WMD by terrorists has not materialised. Increasingly it appears that 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates see themselves less as terrorists and more as a global 
insurgency with certain objectives. They may lack an explicit list of political desiderata, 
but they are waging an effective war of political communication, most obviously via the 
Internet.27
Europe has been more sceptical of the idea of 'new terrorism', instead suggesting that the 
rise of Islamicist terrorism remains rooted in some old political and economic problems. 
It has suited European attitudes to interpret this phenomenon more in terms of a reaction 
to specific policies and military deployments, rather than a general anathemising of the 
West. Gijs de Vries has pointed specifically to lack of progress on the Middle East peace 
process and in Iraq as key factors in terrorist recruitment.28 Others have been inclined to 
talk about a situation in which there is not so much a new terrorism, but a new and more 
globalized environment which presents our enemies with enhanced opportunities. There 
is a globalised world in relation to communications, ideologies and capacity for violence. 
Newness may be more about context, specifically the ability of social and religious 
movements to exploit opportunities provided by globalisation. In other words, developed 
states have encouraged a porous world in which networks move elegantly, but states 
move clumsily. The internet as the ‘network of the networks’ is a good example of this.29   
 
Certainly, the 'new terrorism' of 2001 does not look quite so innovative in retrospect. 
There are likely to be few further 9/11s, but sadly more attacks similar to Bali, Madrid and 
London. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have been quick to seize on the rhetoric 
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of ‘new terrorism’ because it mobilized elected assemblies, delivering enhanced budgets 
and robust packages of security legislation. However it has also provided a convenient 
excuse to forget awkward lessons expensively learned in past decades. Europeans have 
argued that in the rush to address the ‘new terrorism', the United States in particular has 
neglected some of the basic conventions governing the related fields of counter-terrorism, 
counter-insurgency and intelligence. These concern the primacy of political warfare and 
minimum force, a doctrine that is greatly enhanced by good human intelligence. History, 
in almost any decade, underlines that few low intensity conflicts have been successfully 
resolved by a predominantly military approach, and never by applying large scale formal 
military power.  
  
 
Contrasting Counter Terrorism Cultures Post 9/11 
The different strategic cultures of the US and Europe have resulted in contending 
approaches to combating terrorism. In the realm of external security, the most striking 
difference has been in their preparedness to use force. As part of its integrated plan for 
countering terrorism, founded on the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the US 
has accorded priority to its military and intelligence assets. The experience of 9/11 
galvanised the US into a willingness to use its military power pre-emptively against a 
range of threats, in particular alleged state sponsors of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction.  
 
The Pentagon has been in the driving seat of policy execution. The military leads the 'war 
on terror' not only because of the war in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, but 
also because of the wider pattern of counter-terror operations elsewhere. Special forces 
have increasingly been deployed in a military role and are now more the preserve of the 
Pentagon than the CIA.30 They are assisting in the retraining of local security forces in 
dozens of countries, with large contingents in Djibouti and the former Soviet Republic of 
Georgia. A vast military deployment in Colombia is also increasingly justified on the 
grounds of counter-terrorism rather than counter-narcotics. Training operations are under 
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way in dozens of other countries. Most recently in North Africa, a stream of newly-
arrived advisers are seeking to upgrade the capabilities of local forces. Underpinning all 
this is a substantial development of overseas bases to allow the greater projection of 
force.31
 
European governments have tended to assert that military force is a blunt instrument in 
the face of the elusive and disparate targets presented by an increasingly transnational 
terrorism. Europe has been more circumspect than the US in identifying a nexus between 
states of concern, WMD and international terrorism. This was the core of the difference 
between the Bush administration and France and Germany over the war in Iraq. The US 
alleged a link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein and alleged that the threat from 
Iraq’s attempt to develop WMD was imminent. Paris and Berlin were unconvinced by the 
evidence and argued that the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors should be 
granted a longer period to do their work. They were justifiably suspicious that American 
pressure for military action against Iraq owed more to its desire to remove a regime that 
the Washington had long regarded as destabilizing in the region. The cost, however, was 
an iciness in transatlantic relations that has not been easy to overcome. As the US 
position in Iraq has deteriorated, France and Germany have barely contained their 
schadenfruede over the deepening quagmire. 
 
Sections of American elite opinion have viewed the European reluctance to resort to 
force as a reflection of the structural disparity in power between the transatlantic allies. 
They have seen this as consistent with the past predilection of Europe to rely on the 
United States to take care of global threats, such as nuclear proliferation. Neo-
conservative critics in Washington have argued that the Europeans choose to ignore 
threats because of their relative military weakness. In the words of Kagan, ‘The 
incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance. It can also lead to denial’.32
 
The significance accorded to multilateralism is the second major transatlantic difference. 
Europe’s experience of overcoming its own internal rivalries has led it to pursue policies 
based upon building consensus and adhering to the rule of law. This leads it to 
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demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions by working for the broadest degree of 
international support. It was perception of European opponents to the war that America 
had abandoned these principles when it attacked Iraq.  That is not to say that Europe has 
always opposed the use of force. If an action has appeared to be proportionate to the 
aggression and if it is in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, 
then Europe has been willing to support the use of coercive means.  For example, there 
was universal support in Europe for the actions the US took against the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan in 2001. The only European criticism was that the US did not 
draw on the military forces they had offered for the operation and thereby limited the 
breadth of the coalition that toppled the regime. 
 
In contrast, the US has become fearful of being constrained by the veto-power of allies. It 
has come to question the relevance of organisations such as NATO in the face of 
radically new threats that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. The Bush 
administration has expressed its preference for the informality of ‘willing coalitions’ to 
tackle crises rather than recourse to structured alliances. The administration has been 
selective about its international partners and been openly critical about the value of the 
United Nations.   
 
The third difference has been European advocacy of long-term strategies aimed at 
conflict prevention. Overseas aid and poverty reduction have come to be perceived as 
instruments to remove some of the underlying causes of terrorism. Such funding can help 
to alleviate some of the factors that lead to the radicalisation of politics. This is also a 
sphere in which the EU can wield significant strength: it now disburses approximately 
55% of the world’s official development assistance.33 In post-conflict situations, the 
Europeans have been willing to provide troops for protracted peace building projects, 
such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and they have 
provided the lion’s share of resources to re-build functioning societies. The US, for its 
part, has tended to be more sceptical about the value of ‘foreign policy as social work’.34 
The US, and particularly the Pentagon, has been wary of tying down large numbers of US 
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troops in peace-keeping and post-conflict situations. The rapid drawdown of the US 
military presence in Afghanistan after 2001 is testament to this thinking.  
 
Consistent with their reluctance to sanction the use of force, Europe has preferred to offer 
positive incentives to states accused of supporting terrorism to reform their behaviour. 
Trade, diplomacy and cultural contacts have been viewed as more likely instruments to 
modify the errant behaviour of governments such as Libya and Iran and Syria during the 
1990s, rather than the threat of the use of force. Individual European states, as well as the 
European Union, pursued regular interaction in the name of a ‘critical dialogue’. In the 
case of dealings with President Ghaddafi and the government in Libya, Europe could 
point to real achievements in the relationship.35 In 2004, Libya announced that it was 
suspending its attempts to acquire WMD and was establishing a compensation fund for 
the families of the Lockerbie victims, in return for the suspension of economic sanctions.  
 
A less favourable outcome has been forthcoming in relation to Iran. Three European 
countries – the UK, France and Germany (‘E3’) - have offered trade benefits and possible 
admission to the World Trade Organisation in return for an Iranian commitment to 
abandon its alleged programme to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has appeared to spurn 
the opportunities presented to it by the E3, thereby increasing the risk that the case will 
be referred to the UN Security Council. The White House has been persistent in it public 
saber-rattling towards Tehran.36 However in August 2005 it was revealed that a major 
U.S. intelligence review had concluded that Iran is approximately a decade away from 
manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This is twice the previous 
estimate, which had suggested a time period of five years. The sum of assessments by 
more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies directly contradict the dramatic statements 
by the White House and underline scope for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear 
ambitions. 37  
 
Internal security has also revealed some remarkable contrasts between Europe and 
America. Both sides of the Atlantic believe in the importance of combating terrorism 
through law-enforcement, judicial and intelligence cooperation. The Europeans place 
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more emphasis on these instruments because they do not accord the military instrument 
the prominence it is given by the Americans. The Europeans are also predisposed towards 
weighing the balance that is struck between more stringent security measures against 
terrorism and the penalties that are incurred in terms of human rights. They are more 
wary about investing law enforcement personnel with powers that could damage the core 
values of their society.38  
 
 
Nevertheless, the effort of the US in homeland security, since 9/11, should not be 
underestimated.39 The National Strategy for Homeland Security has sought to construct a 
layered defence system. Overseas the US has relied upon its FBI legal attaches working 
in embassies and customs officials, deployed in European ports, monitoring the cargo 
destined for America. The next security circle concerns entry into US territory by 
foreigners and here the US has enhanced the security of airlines, introduced biometric 
identifiers into travel documents, reappraised its visa waiver programmes and tightened 
its borders. Since November 2002, the various agencies responsible for US domestic 
security have been amalgamated into the Department of Homeland Security, the largest 
reorganisation of the federal government since 1947. America’s last line of defence has 
focused on promoting cooperation between its plethora of police and intelligence 
agencies, emergency responders and the enhancement of security of critical infrastructure 
such as power plants and refineries. However, the main focus has been upon 
strengthening borders, with less emphasis on capabilities for dealing with domestic 
events.40
 
As for Europe, steps have been taken since 2001 to close some of its vulnerabilities to 
terrorist activity. Several EU member states have drafted new legislation to prosecute 
terrorist activities and afforded greater operational powers to their police forces: 
information has been circulated more freely amongst intelligence services: new policies 
to target fund raising have been undertaken and there has been a tightening of border 
controls. A common definition of terrorism, that hitherto eluded agreement, was reached 
in draft form in December 2001 and entered into force in June 2002. As well as defining 
the types of crimes that comprise terrorism it also determined stiff penalties to be 
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imposed for terrorist offences.41 Furthermore, efforts to speed up the process of 
continent-wide extradition were achieved with the signing of a European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW). This designated thirty-two offences including terrorism, punishable by at least 
three years’ duration, on which an arrest warrant could be invoked in one country and 
then carried out in the territory of another member. 
 
Weaknesses in Europe’s internal security have persisted in spite of greater resources and 
attention over the last four years. First, the priority attached to counter terrorism varies 
amongst EU states. Whilst countries such as Spain, the UK, France and Germany have 
made strenuous efforts to address the new challenges, other countries have languished 
because they do not perceive an imminent threat to themselves. This is reflected in the 
second factor, namely the reluctance of some countries to implement agreements that 
have been made. Whilst all states have ratification processes that have to be respected, 
some countries have made little effort to draft domestic legislation to bring EU-wide 
conventions into effect. For example, in the case of a Framework Decision on the 
freezing of terrorist assets, the measure was agreed in March 2002, but as late as mid-
2004 there were still states that had not enacted its provisions. Third, the European 
Commission still struggles to coordinate counter terrorism measures between the member 
states and the level of the Union. The EU has no internal security structure with the 
equivalent remit of the US Department of Homeland Security.  
 
 
Convergence or Divergence in Transatlantic Counter Terrorism? 
What are the prospects for transatlantic convergence on counter-terrorism? The practical 
business of everyday internal security cooperation and joint intelligence operations has 
continued in spite of transatlantic political storms.42 Moreover, there has been no simple 
split comprising America versus Europe: the UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands all 
deployed troops to Iraq. Yet longer-term tensions across the Atlantic have remained 
undiminished. The absence of WMD in Iraq confirmed suspicions that American 
explanations of the war were a smokescreen and the exposure of prisoner treatment at 
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons appeared to confirm the worst fears about its 
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actions. At the same time, tensions over Iran have every prospect of escalating as Tehran 
seeks to play off European and American positions.  
 
Contrasting cultures have also thrown up persistent difficulties in both the internal and 
external security domains. First, America and Europe differ over issues such as the use of 
electronic surveillance. The recent decision by the US government to end the separation 
between information obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence communities 
could prove to be a major obstacle to cooperation as it could risk undermining a 
prosecution in a European court if it could be shown that the information on which it was 
based was inadmissible. Second, the US has expressed exasperation with the length of 
time it takes to obtain judicial cooperation with European countries. Third, there has been 
tension over sharing intelligence. The Europeans have been alarmed by what they 
perceive to be the inadequate American attention to issues of data protection. This 
resulted in lengthy negotiations between the US and the European police office (Europol) 
before personal data could be transferred. Again, the media has been a factor since 
European security agencies fear leaks of operationally sensitive information to the 
American press. 
 
Media attention has also heightened European anxieties about the troublesome issue of 
‘extraordinary rendition’. This focuses on the shadowy issue of the American treatment 
of detainees who have been moved to prisons in third countries, including Syria, Jordan 
and Egypt. Initially developed in the 1980s to bring foreign terrorists to trial in the United 
States for crimes overseas, human rights groups have asserted, with considerable 
evidence, that ‘extraordinary rendition’ now represents a system for outsourcing torture. 
It is increasingly clear that this is a substantial programme. In 2002, the Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, told Congress that even prior to 9/11, some 70 people 
had undergone rendition. Congressman Edward J. Markey has suggested that since 9/11 
the number is approximately 150. Confirmation of this has come from unexpected 
sources. On 16 May 2005, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif told a press conference 
that more than 60 suspects had been rendered to his country since September 2001.43 
Cases such as Benyam Mohammed, a former London schoolboy accused of being a 
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dedicated Al-Qaeda terrorist, illustrate the problem. For two years US authorities moved 
him between Pakistan, Morocco and Afghanistan, before he was sent to Guantanamo Bay 
in September last year.44   
 
These issues scare European intelligence and security officials because this runs contrary 
to their own culture.  Since the end of the Cold War, European’s clandestine agencies 
have undergone a quiet revolution. Legality and regulation have been at the centre of this, 
with services being placed on the statute books and the elements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights being written into their regulations.45 European services 
have embraced the new approach which has increased their legitimacy and allowed them 
to develop a wider customer base and conduct more operations. It is not only that the 
utility of these US renditions is unclear, it also that the European culture of public 
expectations is very different.46 As recently as July 2005, intelligence officials in 
Washington expressed dismay that their British counterparts blocked their efforts to have 
a suspect Harron Rashid Aswat seized in South Africa and moved to one of these 
undisclosed detention centres run by allied states, possibly Egypt. As a British citizen of 
Indian descent, London hesitated at the idea of an extraordinary rendition of someone 
with a UK passport.47
 
Yet despite these public indicators of continued trouble, privately there have been 
sustained efforts at transatlantic convergence. At the centre of this a substantial re-
shaping of American counter-terrorism strategy. Even in 2003, it was obvious that 
alongside the dominant military culture of American counter-terrorism was an alternative 
view. This alternative view was propounded largely by officials in the CIA and the State 
Department who emphasised political warfare, economic instruments, patient diplomacy 
and counter-proliferation as an alternative to interventions.48 There was a growing 
recognition that while the core terrorist groups may be impervious to political 
engagement, they draw support from a wider ocean of anti-Westernism throughout the 
Middle East, and indeed Muslim communities throughout the world. Specific policies in 
the Middle East were thought to be a substantial part of the problem. There was perceived 
to be too much emphasis on Osama bin Laden and not enough on the wider hostility that 
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was developing in the Muslim world towards the US. By 2004 this alternative view had 
been given a higher profile by a number of vocal figures who were concerned about the 
lack of progress in the ‘global war on terror’. This included an 'anonymous' CIA officer, 
soon revealed as Michael Scheuer, who was formally head of the CIA's unit specialising 
on Al-Qaeda.49 In February 2004 it was echoed by no other than George Tenet in a 
statement given to the Senate Committee on Intelligence, who urged less focus on Al-
Qaeda and more attention to the general growth of extremism.50   
 
In March 2005 there was evidence that this alternative view was receiving official 
attention. The NSC's Frances Fragos Townsend and her deputy, Juan Carlos Zarate, 
began a wide ranging policy review. The arrival of Condoleezza Rice at the State 
Department was central to this shift. Shortly afterwards, Philip Zelikow, former 9-11 
Commission Staff Director and now special adviser to Rice, was put in charge of a ten 
member committee to reassess policy.  Its meetings, which began in June, have taken it to 
London and Paris with the support of the White House. Privately there have been 
admissions that this initiative owed much to European influence.51 These moves have 
been complemented by the renewed emphasis on public diplomacy at the State 
Department, under the leadership of Karen Hughes.52
 
These changes reflect a disillusionment with the war in Iraq and fears about Afghanistan. 
In Iraq, the Pentagon has accepted that the insurgency is growing more violent, resilient 
and sophisticated. Economic reconstruction has been slowed, Arab diplomats have been 
targeted in Baghdad and the prospect of an early drawdown of US forces has been 
slipping away. The last year has seen approximately 500 suicide attacks.53 Military 
leaders are also anxious about the war in Afghanistan. Although $11 billion per annum is 
spent on keeping 22,000 troops in the field, the shift of attention to Iraq allowed the local 
insurgency a crucial breathing space. Meanwhile the G8 five-pillar reconstruction 
programme has stalled. More broadly, the State Department's most recent statistics paint 
a gloomy picture, showing that across the world there were three times as many terrorist 
attacks in 2004 as against 2003.54
 
 18
A major overhaul of Pentagon strategy has been underway over the last year triggered by 
a growing appreciation of the diffuse nature of Islamic terrorism. One example of this 
was a conference in June 2005 at the Special Operations Command headquarters in 
Tampa, Florida. Special forces commanders and intelligence directors from the US and 
many of its allies were gathered together to discuss the substance of the new counter-
terror strategy. The keynote address was given by General Bryan D. Brown, Head of US 
Special Operations Command, who said that there had been an unambiguous change in 
American thinking and a recognition that 'we will not triumph solely or even primarily 
through military might.'55 Brown is an authoritative voice, given that the Pentagon has 
designated Special Operations Command as the global 'synchronizer' for its new 
strategy.56 Another example is that of General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, who since July 2005, has expressed criticism of the idea that military 
instruments can offer the main solution to countering terrorism.57 He has instructed the 
Pentagon to join the State Department in emphasising the 'war of ideas'. The Pentagon 
has announced contracts amounting to $300 million awarded to companies that will work 
to enhance its psychological operations.58
 
Have there been corresponding changes in Europe? Restored confidence in transatlantic 
approaches will certainly require a change of attitude on both sides. In December 2003, 
the European Council published a ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) that attempted to 
concert policy amongst the EU member states.59. There was some evidence in the 
European Security Strategy that EU states have moved closer to American thinking on 
security threats by acknowledging that terrorist acquisition of WMD was a priority 
consideration and that Europe would have to play a bigger part in addressing security 
challenges outside of its region. Too often in the past European countries left matters 
such as nuclear proliferation to the US. In the earliest draft of the paper, reference was 
made to the possibility of military pre-emption, thereby narrowing the gap with US 
thinking, but in the final draft this was diluted to talk of ‘preventive engagement’. 
Furthermore, the ESS remained wedded to UN approval for military interventions which 
remained at odds with the US. 
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In 2004 and 2005, the US has shown a new willingness to consult with its European allies 
at an early stage of its policy process. The achievements made by the EU in internal 
security have made them a more important partner for the US. In recognition of this, a 
new US-EU forum entitled the ‘High Level Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport 
Security’ has been created. This draws together the US Departments of State, Justice and 
Homeland Security with the EU Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs and 
the European Commission. It is a concerted attempt to build transatlantic cooperation 
from an early stage through the sharing of ideas.  
 
Conclusion  
Strategic culture remains the biggest challenge to transatlantic convergence on counter-
terrorism. Security doctrines are matters of fashion, but strategic culture is much more 
firmly embedded. In the Spring and Summer of 2005 there was clear evidence of new 
thinking in Washington. Yet sceptics doubt whether the new strategy being prepared by 
the White House will result in genuine convergence across the Atlantic. Policy and 
implementation are two different things. Here again, history intertwines with strategic 
culture and past experience points the way. As some of the most insightful US 
commentators on counter-insurgency have remarked, one of the many ironies of 
America’s long engagement with low intensity conflict in Vietnam was that the high-
level strategy was exemplary. However strategic concepts and work-a-day practice were 
worlds apart. The civilian agencies did not wish to touch the dirty business of counter-
insurgency and, on the ground, mid-level military commanders determinedly ignored 
pious exhortations about the value of social engagement. At the operational level, the 
Army in Vietnam remained wedded to high technology and brute force.60  
 
Some Europeans remain sceptical about whether the United States is capable of 
implementing the new strategy because kinetic activities have always tended to be 
America's instinctive first response. Officials in Europe also note that the sort of 
information operations that now seem to form the cutting edge of recent American 
thinking have a nasty habit of backfiring if they are not done well. The available linguists 
and regional experts are already over-stretched by the expanded intelligence effort and it 
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is hard to see where the personnel will come from for sophisticated political operations. 
In short, it is clear that the United States has changed its mind, but they are unsure 
whether the United States is capable of, or indeed has the capacity for, a change of heart. 
There are also sceptics in Washington. Few believe that the White House can persuade 
the many agencies and departments to work more closely together. The new strategies 
have been long in the making for the very reason that Washington has been unable to 
resolve awkward debates over whether Iraq is making more terrorists and whether the 
United States needs to change its policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Some 
observe that resolving to sell existing policies in the region better is an easier bureaucratic 
option than changing them.61  
 
Looking to the future, the implementation of any new strategy will be especially hard 
because some of the problems are now so slippery that no-one in America or Europe 
really knows what to do about them. The new problems may not be a new global 
terrorism, but more the nature of globalisation itself. As early as February 2003, George 
Tenet warned the Senate intelligence committee that globalisation, which had been the 
driving force behind the expansion of the world economy, had simultaneously become a 
serious threat to US security.62 The problem was not so much a new enemy, but a new 
medium. A globalized world favours insurgents groups and puts developed states at a 
disadvantage. The greatest challenge for both European and American strategic thinking 
may be that a range of transnational threats are accelerated by globalisation. The 
uncomfortable truth is that while 'globalization works', it works best for Al-Qaeda and its 
admirers.63  
 
Nevertheless, the EU and the US must redouble their efforts to arrive at common 
perceptions of threats and responses in relation to countering international terrorism. 
They are two international actors that have a history of the closest cooperation and only if 
they act together can this persistent and growing menace be addressed effectively. If they 
fail to work together, if their strategic cultures cause them to continue to diverge, then the 
prospects for the West’s ability to address one of the most important issues on its security 
agenda are bleak. 
 21
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
The research for this article was supported by awards from the Leverhulme Trust and the British 
Academy which are gratefully acknowledged. It has benefited from conversations with officials 
in Europe and the United States. The authors would also like to thank Matthew Aid, Paul 
Lashmar, Timothy Naftali, Martin Rudner and the anonymous reviewers for information and 
suggestions. All errors remain the responsibility of the authors. 
 
 
 
1 Susan B. Glasser, 'Review May Shift Terror Policies', Washington Post, 29 May 2005. 
 
 
 
2 The Pentagon document finalised in March was entitled the 'National Military Strategic Plan for 
the War on Terrorism', see, Linda Robinson, 'Plan Of Attack: The Pentagon has a secret new 
strategy for taking on terrorists--and taking them down', US News and World Report, 1 August 
2005. 
  
3  Lucian Pye, ‘Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of 
Political Culture’, Social Science Quarterly, 53, 1972, pp.285-96. 
 
4  A. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19, 4, Spring 1995, 
pp.32-64 and J. Snyder ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options,’ RAND, 
Santa Monica, 1977. 
 
5 Errol Meidinger, ‘Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline’, Law and Policy, 9, 1987, 355-86.   
 
6 Joanna. Spear, ‘The Emergence of a European “Strategic Personality” and the Implications for 
the Transatlantic Relationship’, Arms Control Today, 33, 9 November 2003, pp.13-18. 
 
 22
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Caroline F. Ziemke, ‘The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A 
Counterproliferation Perspective’, in Victor A. Utgoff (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear 
Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 88-9; 
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time (New York: Free Press, 1986).  
 
8 On the unconscious life of administrative elements see, Howell S. Baum, The Invisible 
Bureaucracy: The Unconscious in Organisational Problem-Solving (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
 
9 Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism, and Alliances,' World Politics, 46, 4, July 1994.: pp.490-526; 
Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances and World Wars, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the 
Vietnam decisions of 1965, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
  
10 An interesting use of the concept that crosses the international-domestic divide is that of 
intelligence culture, see Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in 
Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3, October 204, 
pp.495-519.  
 
11 Neil C. Livingstone, 'Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption and Retribution' 
in C.W. Kegley (ed), International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: St 
Martin's 1990), pp.219-27; Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and 
Countermeasures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.121-7. 
 
12 On the confluence of American idealism and national interest see Christopher Thorne, 
'American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War, Journal of American Studies, 26, 4, 
December 1992, 316-30. On recent lineages of exceptionalism see David Dunn, ‘Myths, 
motivations and “misunderestimations”: the Bush administration and Iraq’, International Affairs, 
79, 2, March 2003, pp.279-97. 
 
  
13 The best summation of American approaches in recent decades is Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: 
The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005). The idea of 
connections between the Soviet Union and state-sponsored terrorism was strongly promoted by 
Claire Sterling's influential book, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International 
 23
                                                                                                                                                                             
Terrorism, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981) but the thesis is now regarded with 
some scepticism. 
 
14  Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (3rd edition, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003) p.227. 
 
15  Revelations about Central America had resulted in a ‘scrub order’ which required high-
level and somewhat laborious approval for the CIA recruitment of agents with an 
unsavoury past, typically with strong terrorist connections or association with human 
rights violations. The rise of a ‘play it safe’ culture during the 1990s is documented in 
Robert Baer’s See No Evil The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism, 
(New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2002). See also Paul Pillar Terrorism and US Foreign 
Policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 
 
16  Although Richard Clarke, America’s Counter Terrorism Coordinator in the 1990s, has 
contrasted the seriousness with which the Clinton Administration treated the threat from 
international terrorism with the lower priority that was attached by the Bush Administration prior 
to 9/11, there are also underlying continuities. See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside 
America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
 
17 This somewhat counter-intuitive observation is persuasively argued in Naftali, Blind Spot, 117-
65. 
 
18 See in particular the 1990s critique of America’s reluctance to intervene, penned by Richard 
Haas, The Reluctant Sheriff (Washington DC: Brookings, 1994). Haas, now President of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, has recently re-thought his position in the light of Iraq and now 
advocates caution in The Opportunity, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 2005).  
 
19  President Bill Clinton, Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 
September 1996.  
 
20 The extensive co-operation between the British, Dutch and German security services against 
IRA activities in continental Europe during the 1980s is an example of this previous pattern.  
 
 24
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 French efforts have placed particular emphasis upon magistrates and their close co-operation 
with the intelligence services, see, Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, 'The French Experience 
of Counter-terrorism', Survival, 45, 1, Spring 2003, pp.67-98.  
 
22 In explaining the action taking by the EU, Vries has chosen to emphasis criminal/judicial 
initiatives.  Speech by Gijs de Vries, European co-ordinator for counter-terrorism, 'European 
Strategy in the fight against terrorism and co-operation with the United States, given at CSIS, 
Washington DC, 13 May 2004, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/CSIS_Washington.13_May_2004.pdf   
 
23 Oliver Roy, ‘EuroIslam: The Jihad Within’, The National Interest, 71, Spring 2003. 
 
24 The references to 'newness' are innumerable. But see for example Bush's comments on 'the new 
and changing threat'  and the  'new and very complex challenge' in his forward to 'National 
Strategy for Homeland Security', Office of Homeland Security, July 2002,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf   
 
25 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). See also Ian 
O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, Brian Michael 
Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (Washington DC: RAND 1999). 
 
26 Bruce Hoffman has used the persuasive analogy of a capital investment company. Others have 
talked of franchises.  Bruce Hoffman, 'The Leadership Secrets of Osama Bin Ladin: The Terrorist 
as CEO‘, Atlantic Monthly, April 2002, pp.26-7. 
 
27 The first to engage with the 'newness' problem was Thomas Copeland in his timely essay 'Is the 
"New Terrorism" Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism', Journal of 
Conflict Studies, XI, 2, Fall 2001, pp.2-27. On the wider issue of new threats and old lessons, see 
C.M. Andrew, 'Intelligence Analysis Needs to Look Backwards Before Looking Forward: Why 
lessons of the past can help fight terror of the future', History and Policy, June 2004 and Robert 
Jervis, 'An Interim Assessment of September 11: What has Changed and What Has Not?', 
Political Science Quarterly 117, 1, 2002, pp.37-54. 
 
 25
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 'Interview with Gijs de Vries on terrorism, Islam and democracy', 6 September 2005, 
Euroactiv.com http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-136245-16&type=Interview  
 
29 This thesis is most clearly explored in Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization 
and the Terrorist Threat (London Continuum, 2002). 
 
30 The Pentagon boasts a wide variety of special forces, while the CIA also has its own soldiers in 
the form the Special Activities Division (SAD). Their modus operandi are different. 
 
31 Ann Scott Tyson, ‘U.S. Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa’, Washington Post, 25 July 2005. 
 
32  Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2003). 
 
33  European Commission website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index-en.htm
 
34  Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign Affairs, 75, 1 
January/February 1996, pp.70-85.  
 
35 The initial dialogue with Libya over WMD was developed by the overseas intelligence services 
of the UK and Libya, see Julian Coman and Colin Brown, 'Revealed: The Real Reason for 
Libya's WMD Surrender', The Telegraph, 21 December 2003. 
 
36 These were accompanied by private explorations of options. In 2002, Bush's deputy national 
security adviser, had commissioned a paper which looked at options for regime change in Iran 
citing WMD issue as the driver. 
 
37 Dafna Linzer, 'Review Finds Iran Far From Nuclear Bomb: Estimate of Progress Contrasts 
With Administration Statements', Washington Post, 2 August 2005. 
 
38 On the issue of values see Alex Danchev, 'How Strong are Shared Values in the Transatlantic 
Relationship', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7, 3, August 2005, pp. 429-
36. 
 
39 DoD has absorbed about half of all emergency funding since 9/11, Center for Defense 
Information, 'Security After 9/11 Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs January 2003', pp.10-
11.  http://www.cdi.org/mrp/security-after-911.pdf 
 26
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
40 Hurricane Katrina has confirmed what many commentators have feared, namely that American 
domestic agencies remain ill-coordinated and four years after 9/11 the United States is still not 
capable of dealing effectively with a mass casualty event. 
 
 
41 Leading a terrorist group was liable to a sentence of at least 15 years whilst financing its 
operations was liable to a punishment of at least 8 years. There are close parallels with the Italian 
‘deep-freeze’ approach of long sentences for terrorism, adopted in the late 1970s. 
 
42  See in particular the discussion of multinational 'Alliance Base' activities run out of Paris, 
described in Dana Priest, 'Help From France in Key Covert Operations', Washington Post, 3 July 
2005. 
 
43 George Tenet in 911 Commission Hearing, transcript for 3/24/04 session; Edward J. Markey, 
Boston Globe, 12 March 2005; Shaun Waterman, 'Egypt: U.S. hands over terror suspects' , 
Washington Times, 17 May 2005. 
 
44 Stephen Grey and Ian Cobain, 'Suspect's tale of travel and torture: Alleged bomb plotter claims 
two and a half years of interrogation under US and UK supervision in "ghost prisons" abroad', 
The Guardian, 2 August 2005.  
 
45 Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter Gill, Dennis Töllborg (eds.), Democracy, law, and security : internal 
security services in contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), The process began as a 
Europe-wide response to the Leander case brought by the European Court initially against the 
Swedish Security Service.   
 
46 The matter has been complicated by arguments over the relative advantages of long-term 
observation of suspects, versus capture and interrogation, see Jimmy Burns, Stephen Fidler and 
Demetri Sevastopulo,  'Different approach to tackling terrorism exposed', Financial Times, 12 
July 2005. 
 
47  Philip Sherwell and Sean Rayment, 'Britain and American clash over tactics', Telegraph, 31 
July 2005.  
 
 27
                                                                                                                                                                             
48 There were many alternative views, even within the Pentagon, and no effort can be made to 
catalogue them here. However, they were accentuated by anxieties in State and at Langley about 
the prominence of the Pentagon - often expressed as the 'eight hundred pound gorrilla problem'.  
 
49  Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Imperial Hubris; Why the West is loosing the war on Terror 
(New York: Brasseys, 2004). 
 
50 George Tenet,  ‘The Worldwide threat 2004: Challenges in Changing Global Context’, 
Statement to the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004, www.cia.com 
 
51   Guy Dinmore, 'US shifts anti-terror policy', Financial Times, 31 July 2005. Rice and Zelikow 
have worked closely together over a long period and in 1997 co-authored a book on the final 
collapse of communism in Europe. 
 
52  Susan B. Glasser, 'Review May Shift terror Policies', Washington Post, 29 May 2005. 
 
 
53 Recently the Saudi government commissioned a study of Saudi foreign fighters making their 
way to Iraq. It found that it was the invasion of Iraq that was prompting jihadists to volunteer and 
most had not been in contact with radical organisations before 2003. Patrick Coburn, 'Iraq: This is 
Now an Unwinnable Conflict', Independent on Sunday, 24 July 2005. 
 
 
54 Sussan B. Glasser, 'U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise In Terrorism', Washington Post, 27 
April 2005. 
 
 
55  Interview with General Bryan D. Brown, Special Operations Technology, 3, 4, 7 June 2005. 
 
 
56 Robert Fox, ‘GWOT is History. Now for SAVE’, New Statesman, 8 August 2005. 
 
 
57 Alec Russell, 'Don't mention war on terror, say Bush aides', Telegraph, 27 July 2005.  
 
 
58 Renae Merle, 'Pentagon Funds Diplomatic Effort: Contracts Aim to Improve Foreign Opinion 
of United States', Washington Post, 11 June 2005. 
 
 
 28
                                                                                                                                                                             
59 Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Office of the High Representative for 
CFSP, Brussels, www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms/Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76225.pdf
 
 
60 Michael McClintock. Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and 
Counterterrorism, 1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992). See also Larry E. Cable, 
Conflict of Myths: the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam 
War  (New York: New York University Press, 1986). 
 
 
61 Some diplomats fear that the new strategy may remove the State Department's control over 
foreign security programs in favour of the Pentagon, while the CIA worries about the military 
interest in expanding its human intelligence capabilities. Interviews, Washington DC, June 2005. 
 
62 Edward Alden, 'Globalisation Cited as Threat to US Security' , Financial Times, 11 February 
2003. 
 
63 Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
 
 29
